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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court’s reversal of the magistrate’s
order denying Jessica Lynn King’s motion to suppress evidence.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state cited King for second offense misdemeanor DUI. (R., pp. 5-6.)
She moved to suppress “evidence on the grounds that it was illegally obtained.”
(R., p. 15.)

The basis for the motion was a claim that the officer lacked

reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop. (R,. pp. 17-22, 26-27.)
At the hearing on the motion Patrol Sergeant Lathrop testified that he was
on patrol at about 2:45 a.m. when he observed a car with “its left turn signal on
going through intersections.” (Tr., p. 5, L. 19 – p. 6, L.14.) Sergeant Lathrop
testified it went through three intersections before he “pulled it over” as it turned
left at the fourth intersection. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 15-25; p. 10, Ls. 18-22.) Sergeant
Lathrop concluded driving through three intersections with the turn signal on was
concerning, not normal, and indicated to him in his professional experience that
the driver might be intoxicated. (Tr., p. 7, Ls. 1-22; p. 12, Ls. 7-13; p. 12, L. 21 –
p. 13, L. 9.)
The magistrate concluded that King’s driving pattern under the totality of
the circumstances provided reasonable suspicion she was driving under the
influence. (Tr., p. 20, L. 20 – p. 22, L. 7.) Thereafter King entered a conditional
guilty plea to the charge. (Tr., p. 23, L. 6 – p. 28, L. 21.) King thereafter filed a
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notice of appeal to the district court, timely from the entry of judgment.
(R., pp. 30, 31.)
The district court reversed the order denying suppression, concluding that
the facts did not support reasonable suspicion of DUI and also concluding that
driving through three intersections with a turn signal on but not turning was not
reasonable suspicion of inattentive driving. (R., pp. 73-81.) The state filed a
notice of appeal timely from the district court’s intermediate appellate decision.
(R., pp. 83-85.)
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ISSUES
Did the district court err by reversing the magistrate’s ruling on the motion
to suppress because the facts supported the magistrate’s conclusion that there
was reasonable suspicion to believe King was driving under the influence and
because there was reasonable suspicion that she was driving inattentively?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Reversing The Magistrate’s Ruling On The Motion To
Suppress Because The Facts Supported The Magistrate’s Conclusion That
There Was Reasonable Suspicion To Believe King Was Driving Under The
Influence And Because There Was Reasonable Suspicion That She Was Driving
Inattentively
A.

Introduction
Sergeant Lathrop testified that King drove through three intersections with

her left turn signal on at 2:45 in the morning, and then turned left as he pulled her
over. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 11-21.) The magistrate found that she went through “at least
two” intersections with her turn signal on and that “the officer in his 16 years of
experience found that to be indicative of someone that might be under the
influence of drugs or alcohol while driving, [at] that time of night.” (Tr., p. 20,
L. 20 – p. 21, L. 19.) On appeal, however, the district court reversed.1 It first
concluded that “driving patterns that are merely unusual or irregular but not illegal
do not justify a suspicion to support a traffic stop,” and therefore there was no
reasonable articulable suspicion of DUI. (R., p. 76.) This analysis applies an
incorrect legal standard because reasonable suspicion of DUI does not require
an “illegal” driving pattern.

The district court also held that driving through

multiple intersections with a turn signal on did not constitute reasonable
suspicion of inattentive driving. (R., pp. 76-81.) This analysis is error because it
is directly contrary to applicable Idaho Supreme Court precedent.

1

The district court incorrectly stated the facts. The district court stated King
drove through two intersections with her turn signal on without turning.
(R., p. 74.) The trial court found it was “at least two” intersections (Tr., p. 20,
L. 20 – p. 21, L. 19) while the officer testified it was three intersections (Tr., p. 6,
Ls. 11-21).
4

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate

appellate capacity, the reviewing court “directly review[s] the district court’s
decision.” State v. DeWitt, 145 Idaho 709, 711, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App.
2008) (citing Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008)). The
appellate court “examine[s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate’s findings of fact
and whether the magistrate’s conclusions of law follow from those findings.” Id.
In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, the appellate court
accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial
evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those
facts. State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007).
C.

The District Court Applied An Erroneous Legal Standard When It Required
Suspicion Of An Illegality In Addition To DUI To Conduct A Traffic Stop
“A traffic stop by an officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle’s occupants

and implicates the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.” State v. Young, 144 Idaho 646, 648, 167 P.3d 783, 785
(Ct. App. 2006) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).
Ordinarily, a warrantless seizure must be based on probable cause to be
reasonable. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499-500 (1983); State v. Bishop,
146 Idaho 804, 811, 203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009). However, limited investigatory
detentions, based on less than probable cause, are permissible when justified by
an officer’s reasonable, articulable suspicion that a person has committed, or is
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about to commit, a crime. Royer, 460 U.S.at 498; Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811,
203 P.3d at 1210. “An officer may also stop a vehicle to investigate possible
criminal behavior if there is reasonable articulable suspicion that the vehicle is
being driven contrary to traffic laws.” Young, 144 Idaho at 648, 167 P.3d at 785
(citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)). “Reasonable suspicion
requires less than probable cause but more than speculation or instinct on the
part of the officer.” State v. Horton, 150 Idaho 300, 302, 246 P.3d 673, 675
(Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted). Whether an officer possessed reasonable
suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of the circumstances known to the
officer at or before the time of the stop. Bishop, 146 Idaho at 811, 203 P.3d at
1210; State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2003).
The district court did not apply this standard to determine whether
Sergeant Lathrop properly stopped King for suspicion of DUI. The district court
required evidence of an “illegal” driving pattern rather than mere evidence that
King was driving under the influence, but otherwise legally. (R., p. 76.) This
application of an erroneous legal standard led to an erroneous reversal of the
magistrate’s finding of reasonable suspicion.

The Idaho Supreme Court has

specifically stated “there are two possible justifications for a traffic stop—the
officer has reasonable suspicion that a driver has committed an offense, such as
a traffic offense, or the officer has reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity,
such as driving under the influence.”
362 P.3d 514, 517 (2015).

State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 442,

The magistrate’s determination of reasonable
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suspicion of DUI justified the stop even without evidence that King was otherwise
driving illegally.
Moreover, cases holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion to stop a
motorist for DUI even though no other traffic violations were observed are
numerous. Examples include State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d
1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996), where the Court of Appeals held that a “weaving
pattern, with the vehicle three times touching the lines on edges of the lane, was
not within the range of normal driving behavior and was an objective indication
that the driver was impaired.” See also State v. Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208-09,
953 P.2d 645, 648-49 (Ct. App. 1998). Also, in Wilson v. Idaho Transp. Dep’t,
136 Idaho 270, 276, 32 P.3d 164, 170 (Ct. App. 2001), the officer had reasonable
suspicion of DUI even though no driving pattern was known to him, but a citizen
called police with information that Wilson had left a residence under the influence
in a specific vehicle. See also State v. Larson, 135 Idaho 99, 101-02, 15 P.3d
334, 336-37 (Ct. App. 2000). Indeed, it is well established that “the existence of
alternative innocent explanations does not necessarily negate reasonable
suspicion.” State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 411, 283 P.3d 722, 728 (2012)
(citations omitted). See also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-276
(2002); State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 917, 42 P.3d 706, 710 (Ct. App. 2001)
(“a series of acts that appear innocent, when viewed separately, may warrant
further investigation when viewed together” (internal quotations omitted)).
In this case King drove through multiple intersections with her turn signal
on without turning. The magistrate determined that, at that time of night (it was
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2:45 a.m.), an officer with Sergeant Lathrop’s experience (16 years) could
reasonably suspect that she was under the influence. (Tr., p. 20, L. 20 – p. 22,
L. 7.) This determination was based on application of the correct legal standards
as stated above. See also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981)
(“[A] trained officer draws inferences and makes deductions – inferences and
deductions that might well elude an untrained person.”); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho
176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App. 2004) (“An officer may draw reasonable
inferences from the facts in his or her possession, and those inferences may be
drawn from the officer’s experience and law enforcement training.”); State v.
Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P.2d 453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990) (“An officer’s
training and experience often play a role in pinpointing facts and circumstances
that give rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity afoot.”). Because the
district court applied an erroneous legal standard, it erred by reversing the
magistrate who had applied the correct legal standard.

Application of the

relevant legal standards shows that King’s driving pattern was suspicious, not
normal, and that the stop was justified by reasonable suspicion that King was
driving under the influence.
D.

The District Court Also Erred When It Concluded That Sergeant Lathrop
Lacked Reasonable Suspicion Of Inattentive Driving
Addressing whether Sergeant Lathrop had reasonable suspicion above

and beyond his suspicion of DUI, the district court reviewed whether Sergeant
Lathrop had reasonable suspicion of inattentive driving, concluding he did not.
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(R., pp. 76-81.) Applying the legal standards set forth above shows the district
court also erred in this analysis.
The elements of inattentive driving are as follows:
1. On or about [date],
2. in the state of Idaho,
3. the defendant [name] drove or was in actual physical control of a
vehicle
4. upon a highway, or upon public or private property open to the
public, and
5. the defendant drove the vehicle in an inattentive, careless or
imprudent manner, in light of the circumstances then existing,
rather than heedless or wanton, or drove in a manner where the
danger to persons or property from the defendant’s conduct was
slight.
I.C.J.I. 1031. See also I.C. § 49-1401(3). That Sergeant Lathrop had reasonable
suspicion of the first four elements of this offense is undisputed.

The only

question is whether Sergeant Lathrop had more than a hunch that King was
driving “in an inattentive, careless or imprudent manner, in light of the
circumstances then existing” or if she created a “slight” “danger to persons or
property.”
The Idaho Supreme Court has concluded that driving through multiple
intersections signaling an intent to turn but not turning constitutes reasonable
suspicion of inattentive driving. Deen v. State, 131 Idaho 435, 435, 958 P.2d
592, 592 (1998). The facts of that case were as follows: “About midnight on
October 27, 1996, a Boise City police officer (the officer) stopped a vehicle being
driven west on Bond Street in Boise by Trudy M. Deen (Deen) after observing
Deen activate her right-hand turn signal and then fail to make the indicated righthand turn at three consecutive intersections.” Id. at 435, 958 P.2d at 592. The
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Court held: “Deen’s conduct in activating her turn indicator and then leaving it
flashing while she drove through three consecutive intersections provided the
officer with reasonable and articulable suspicion that Deen was engaged in
inattentive driving, which is a violation of the motor vehicle code. I.C. § 491401(3).” Id. at 436, 958 P.2d at 593. This precedent is on point and controlling;
the district court erred by not following it.
The district court attempted to distinguish Deen on the basis that, unlike
Deen, King eventually made the signaled turn:
However, the instant case is distinguishable from Deen on its facts.
The driver in Deen never turned; King completed the signaled turn
in this case. The most that can be said about the instant case, then,
is that King activated her turn signal, delayed the turn for two
blocks, then completed the turn as signaled without incident. King
contends as soon as she made the turn, any basis for charging
inattentive driving that may have existed under the theory of Deen
became fully dissipated. In other words, addition of the fact of the
completed turn to the chronology means that the circumstance of
the activated turn signal, standing alone, no longer gives rise to any
reasonable basis for suspicion of inattentive driving. It simply
becomes an early turn signal followed by a completed turn without
incident, which at any hour of the day is a common, ordinary
occurrence without any element of wrongdoing.
(R., p. 80.) This analysis is flawed, however. That King was attentive on the
fourth intersection did not make her any less inattentive for the first three.
Reasonable suspicion that she had been inattentive by driving through three
intersections signaling a turn but not turning was not “dissipated” by a proper turn
later accomplished.
King signaled an intent to turn at three intersections, but did not turn. Such
signaling, but failing to turn as signaled, indicated to an experienced officer that
she was under the influence or otherwise inattentive to her driving.
10

The

magistrate correctly concluded that the traffic stop was justified, and the district
court therefore erred by reversing.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court and
reinstate the judgment of the magistrate.
DATED this 11th day of October, 2016.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_______
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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